

УДК 329.15(44:497.1)"197"

DOI <https://doi.org/10.31212/tokovi.2026.2.fil.193-222>

Оригинални научни рад/Original scientific paper

Received/Примљен: 14. 2. 2026.

Accepted/Прихваћен: 14. 8. 2026.

Luka Filipović

Institute for Contemporary History, Belgrade

luka.filipovic@isi.ac.rs

ORCID: 0000-0002-1810-6175

The Shifting Perspective: Yugoslav Communists and the Changes of French Communist Party's Ideology during the Political Crisis of 1970s

ABSTRACT: This article examines changes of Yugoslav perspectives of the reformist policies that were first adopted, and then abandoned by the French communists during the political crisis of the 1970s. In addition, it explores the development of relations between LCY and PCF, as well as numerous factors that could have influenced the process during which those relations evolved from the state of nearly constant conflict towards the state of cordial cooperation in less than a decade. The article is primarily based on the analysis of Yugoslav archival sources and thus far published scholarly literature from various fields of social sciences and humanities.

KEYWORDS: LCY, PCF, welfare state crisis, détente, Eurocommunism, Josip Broz Tito, Georges Marchais.

Turbulent relations between LCY and PCF before the beginning of the Eurocommunist chapter in the history of the French Communist Party

After the Yugoslav-Soviet split of 1948, a certain number of French communists quickly found themselves among the most passionate supporters of the Yugoslav socialist model on the European far left. Scholarly analyses indicate that the French Communist Party (PCF) was already at this time con-

sidered to be the most radical of the European Marxist parties outside the Eastern Bloc.¹ Analysts employed by the LCY (League of Communists of Yugoslavia) Department for International Relations have, on numerous occasions between 1957 and 1975, assessed that a temporary distancing between the Yugoslav and the Soviet party will be less challenging to overcome than the distancing between the LCY and the PCF.²

Numerous political and social factors could have contributed towards the post-war radicalization of PCF attitudes. Historians estimate that De Gaul's policy of disarmament or integration of the Communist resistance towards the end of WWII might have provoked long-term resentment among the French communists which was then articulated through further radicalization of the party's ideology.³ On the other hand, it should be noted that throughout the second half of the XX century, the PCF was the only major communist party in Europe outside the Eastern Bloc that operated in a country whose political landscape was mostly dominated by left-wing parties. Scholars assessed that a state of continuous political competition on the left pushed French communists into constantly reaffirming an image of the PCF as the most radical left-wing party.⁴ The urge of French communists to preserve a political identity of the PCF as a zealous party that wages a crusade against those leftists who would come to terms with living in a capitalist reality became especially influential with the expansion of "welfare state" policies in 1950s and 1960s. Unlike their Italian and Greek counterparts, who con-

-
- 1 Gino G. Raymond, *The French Communist Party During the Fifth Republic – A Crisis of Leadership and Ideology* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 40–63; Georges Lavau, „The PCF, the State and the Revolution: An Analysis of Party Policies, Communications and Popular Culture”, in *Communism in Italy and France*, ed. Donald Blackmer, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87–143.
 - 2 Archives of Yugoslavia (AY), League of Communists of Yugoslavia (507), Commission for International Relations (IX), 30/I-213, KPF, Report on the development of cooperation between the LCY and the PCF, 1968.
 - 3 Jeannine Verdès-Leroux, „The French Communist Party in the 1950s – Between the National Tradition and Counter-Culture”, in *France and Mass Media*, ed. B. Rigby (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 5–19; George Wright, „Reflections on the French Resistance 1940–1944”, *Political Science Quarterly* 77, no. 3 (1962), 336–349.
 - 4 Charles A. Micaud, „Organization and Leadership of the French Communist Party”, *World Politics* 4, no. 3 (1952), 318–355; Annie Kriegel, „The present theory of power of the French Communist Party”, *Government and Opposition* 2, no. 2 (1967), 253–268.

templated reforming their party policies in order to respond to many new challenges that arose from the social and cultural changes, French communists were more inclined to resolve the issue of growingly influential reformist fractions within the party through the means of disciplinary measures and expulsions.⁵

Throughout the 1960s, authors of the reports from the LCY Department of International Relations repeatedly wrote about their predictions that French communists will continue moving further away from the other communists of the Mediterranean region and closer towards the Eastern Bloc parties.⁶ These predictions were, to a certain extent, confirmed in 1967, when the French communists started openly criticizing reformist tendencies in Czechoslovakian party, as well as supporting Soviets in their decision to refuse the demands of Italian and Spanish communists to organize an international Marxist conference that would discuss reformist ideas present within other communist parties and movements in Europe and around the world.⁷ Scholars have estimated that PCF leadership at the time started growing more and more radical in response to the rising influence of various reformist fractions within the French party. These fractions were, though still not united behind a common agenda, gathered around the notion that each individual Marxist party should create its own unique policies in accordance with its own social and political circumstances. Subsequently, they criticized the tradition of appropriating principles derived from the Bolshevik socialist model in the policy making process, which was preserved to a certain extent by all the Mediterranean communist parties, but in the case of Italian, Greek and Spanish

5 Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Intellectuals and the French Communist Party: Disillusion and Decline* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 105–132.

6 AY, Cabinet of the President of the Republic (837), I-3-a/27-18, Reports about the reception of Jean Paul Sartre, 13. 6. 1960; AY, 507, IX, 30/I-237, Information on the visit of Roger Garaudy, 1969.

7 These actions of the French communists served as a cause for several conflicts between the PCF and the LCY in 1967 and 1968. The most severe among these conflicts was caused by the French party trying to organize an international conference that would criticize reforms in Czechoslovakia during the spring of 1968. Yugoslav analysts were shocked at the fact that French communists seemingly acted on their own accord and before the Soviet party defined official party attitudes towards the events in Czechoslovakia. – AY, 507-IX, 30/I-213, Report on the development of cooperation between the LCY and the PCF, 1968.

communists, it was never followed in practice as enthusiastically as in the case of the French party.⁸

During the 1968 split on the European far-left, caused by the Czechoslovakian crisis, the PCF leadership tried to preserve both cordial relations with the Soviet party as well as authoritarian mechanisms of running a growingly complex political machinery within their own party. However, under the pressure of the general public and other political parties in France, other Marxist parties outside the Eastern Bloc, as well as internal opposition within the party, the PCF leadership was eventually forced to accept a compromising solution.⁹ According to the new doctrine defined by the PCF leadership through decrees in early 1969, French communists were to condemn the military intervention in Czechoslovakia as an act of aggression, but there was to be no discussion about the potential ideological causes of the violence. At the same time, partial reforms to individual party policies and the democratization of decision-making process were permitted to accumulate gradually, but there would be no grand congress that would formally adopt the new party ideology, as was the case with the XII Congress of Italian communists. From that point onwards, PCF leadership was slowly moving towards accepting the reforms already conducted by Italian, Greek and Spanish communists, but it would still take years before the extent of these reforms becomes comparable with those parties who already started using the term Eurocommunism to define their new ideology.¹⁰

On the other hand, Yugoslav communists were, already during the mid-1960s, eager to support the reforms of party policies conducted by Italian, Greek and Spanish communists. Later analysis shows that many leading Yugoslav communists at the time contemplated about participating in creation of a new initiative on the European far-left that would strive to reduce the

8 Kenneth R. Libbey, „The French Communist party in the 1960s: An Ideological Profile”, *Journal of Contemporary History* 11, no. 1 (1976), 145–165; Silvio Pons, *The Rise and Fall of Eurocommunism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 45–65; Vjekoslav Mikecin, *Evrokomunizam i socijalizam* (Zagreb: Globus, 1979), 148–221.

9 At the time, Yugoslav analysts wrote that the French party is in a state of the informal internal split. – AY, 507-IX, 30/I-211, Analysis of the proposition for expansion of cooperation between the LCY and the PCF, 1968.

10 Jean Elleinstein, „Eurocommunism and the French communist party”, in *In Search of Eurocommunism*, ed. R. Kindersley (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1981), 66–79.

Soviet influence on the communist parties outside the Eastern Bloc.¹¹ Gradual strengthening of reformist fractions among Italian, Greek and Spanish communists occurred at the same time as socialist Yugoslavia entered a “reformist period” of its history. From the VIII Congress of the LCY in 1964, until the election of new reformist leaderships in state party structures of Serbia and Croatia in 1968, Yugoslav communists already introduced numerous new policies aiming at internal democratization and party decentralization. In later conversations between Italian and Yugoslav communists, these changes of the Yugoslav socialist model will be defined as starting points for a new wave of reformism among the Marxist parties of Western Europe.¹²

Starting from 1965, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia constantly expanded its policies of providing financial aid to Spanish and Greek communists. After the introduction of the new ideology of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) at the XII Congress of Italian communists in 1969, the PCI was also included in the Yugoslav programs of financial aid, despite the fact that Italian party leadership wasn't operating from exile like in the case of the Greek and Spanish party, and that the PCI was one of the largest political parties in Italy with a considerable amount of financial power and control over the increasingly influential labor unions.¹³ These policies of financial aid included, beside regular or irregular transfers of money, paid vacations on the Adriatic shore, research trips and seminars in Yugoslavia, healthcare services, scholarships for attending courses at Yugoslav universities, substitutes for publication of books and newspapers in Mediterranean countries, as well

11 Luka Filipović, *Evrokomunizam i Jugoslavija 1968-1980* (Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2023), 61–73; Bogdan Živković, „Two Last Encounters Between Broz and Berlinguer – the Epilogue of an Alliance”, *Balkanica* 53, no. 1 (2022), 274–300; Petar Dragišić, „The Yugoslav Perspective on Eurocommunism in the Second Half of the 1970s”, *Balkanica* 54, no. 1 (2023), 301–317; Саша Мишић, „Не може се више поновити 1948. година!: Југославија и италијански комунисти и социјалисти 1957–1962”, *Токови историје* 30, no. 2 (2022), 153–185.

12 AY, 507-IX, 48/I-429, Recorded conversations between LCY and PCI representatives held during the XII Congress of the Italian Communist Party in Bologna, 1969.

13 Luka Filipović, „Finansijska politika Saveza komunista Jugoslavije prema komunističkim partijama Italije, Francuske, Španije i Grčke krajem šezdesetih godina 20. veka”, *Istorija 20. veka* 40, no. 2 (2022), 477–494; Luka Filipović, „Zenith and Downfall of the Mediterranean far-left: League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Eurocommunists in the late 1970s”, *Istorija 20. veka* 44, no. 2 (2026), 511–530.

as financing of numerous artistic projects.¹⁴ In late 1969 and early 1970, some members of the reformist fractions within the French Communist Party were also included in the Yugoslav programs of financial aid, causing the conservative fractions to develop even further animosities towards the LCY, whom they grown to view as an advocate and a financier of the reformist tendencies among the communist parties of the Western Bloc.¹⁵

It is very important to observe the relationship between the French and Yugoslav parties in a contrast with the relationship between the LCY and the Italian Communist Party. For example, while the early Eurocommunist ideas of the Italian communists were enthusiastically supported by the leadership of the LCY in the late 1960s, reformist tendencies of Georges Marchais in the early 1970s were received with far less trust. On the one hand, this was to be somewhat expected outcome, having in mid the aforementioned turbulent relationship between the two parties, and also the role of Italian communists in undermining the Soviet influence on the European far-left after the Czechoslovakian crisis. However, these perspectives would suffer a radical shift during the political crisis of the 1970s in Western Europe: while Eurocommunist reforms of the PCI became increasingly viewed as pillars of political compromises between Italian communists and other political parties in Italy that the LCY perceived as dangerous, the Yugoslav leadership increasingly favored the French party's hesitancy to see through the same policy reforms.¹⁶

From the formal renewal of cooperation between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the French Communists Party in 1957 until the late 1960s, the development of relations between the two parties was marked by frequent ideological disagreements and open displays of resentment from both parties. However, this does not appear to have hindered the continued expansion of cooperation between the institutions of the two parties, nor the

14 AY, 507-IX, 48/I-430, Information on the request of the PCI for financial aid from the LCY, 1969; AY, 507-IX, 122/I-113, Analysis of the proposals for financial aid towards the PCE, 3. 5. 1972;

15 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-228, Report about the internal development within the PCF, 2. 5. 1969.

16 On the shifting perspectives of Yugoslav communists on the reforms within the PCI and their repercussions on the political situation in Italy (and its relationship with Yugoslavia) see: Luka Filipović, „From Insufficient to Dangerous: Changing Attitudes of Yugoslav Communists on the Concept of *Historic Compromise* of the Italian Communist Party 1972–1980.”, *Tokovi Istorije* 33, no. 3 (2025), 423–450.

steady increase in the number of letters exchanging formal expressions of cordiality between representatives of the LCY and the PCF.¹⁷ Just weeks before the conflict over the attitudes about the reforms in Czechoslovakia caused a brief interruption in relations between LCY and PCF during 1968 and 1969, Yugoslav analysts preparing reports commissioned by the Department of International Relations observed that meetings of the Yugoslav representatives with various PCF delegates became almost as frequent as those with representatives of the Italian party.¹⁸ After cooperation between the two parties was reestablished in late 1969 and early 1970, relations between Yugoslav and French communists became even more turbulent and complex, since the main cause of animosities expressed by PCF leaders towards the LCY now became the role of the Yugoslav party in supporting Eurocommunist parties, as well as Eurocommunist groups within the French party.¹⁹ However, analysts from the Department of International relations assessed that relations between the LCY and the PCF will become more and more stable as the Eurocommunists gain more prominence within the French party, which they considered to be an unavoidable consequence of both the rising Eurocommunist influence in other Marxist parties of the Mediterranean, as well as changes in political landscape of France.²⁰

*Yugoslav support for the reforms within French Communist Party –
From the beginning of political crisis in Western Europe
to the Berlin Conference*

In the early seventies, Yugoslavia was frequently visited by the French communists who desired to conduct research of the Yugoslav socialist model. Notable French philosophers, journalists and union leaders, who were also members of one of the reformist fractions within the French party, published

17 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-211, Letter from the Central Committee of the PCF about expansion of cooperation, 1968.

18 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-213, Report on the development of cooperation between the LCY and the PCF, 1968.

19 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-224, Analysis of Kira Hadži Vasilev's conversations with PCF leadership, 2. 12. 1969.

20 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-236, Information about the international colloquium about development, PCF, 1969.

articles in which they discussed what the PCF could learn from the recent reforms of party and state policies conducted in Yugoslavia.²¹ The willingness of the Yugoslav party's offices to finance those trips and publications became yet another cause for tensions between the leaderships of the LCY and the PCF. However, conservative French communists at the time seemed committed to honor the informal compromise which prevented the split in the French party during the turbulent events of 1968 and 1969. Subsequently, they refrained from vigorously criticizing those French communists who emphasized the image of LCY policies as a model for the same reforms PCF leadership claimed to be determined to define in near future.²² That was especially noteworthy from the perspective of the analysts employed by the LCY. Party analysts immediately highlighted the contrast between the conservatives' silence when French reformists wrote affirmatively about the Yugoslav model in the early 1970s, and the heated debates within French party press over the same issue in the aftermath of the student protests in Belgrade and France during the spring and summer of 1968.²³

In addition to the internal crisis within the party, the PCF faced the broader political unrest and uncertainty that permeated French society during the period historians have subsequently described as the “crisis of the welfare state”. In the aftermath of revolts and strikes that marked the end of 1960s, many Western European countries found themselves in a state of constant political turmoil, when the growingly unstable and short-lived governments strived to push back against the political power of labor unions, and against the rising tide of protests, street violence, crime and terrorism.²⁴ After the oil shock of 1974, the already rampant political crisis was compounded by a temporary stagnation in development of Western European economies. All of these occurrences will later serve as a justification for the introduction of

21 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-212, Information about the visit of Antoine Casanova, editor of the PCF paper *Nouvelle Critique*, 4–18. 4. 1968; AY, 507-IX, 30/I-237, Reports about the research visits of PCF members, 1969–1970.

22 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-230–260, Reports about the writings of the PCF press about Yugoslavia, 1971–1973.

23 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-251, Report about the new attitudes of PCF about LCY, 1972.

24 Emile Chabal, „French Political Culture in the 1970s”, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 42, no. 2 (2016), 243–265; Michael Moran, „Crisis of the Welfare State”, *British Journal of Political Science* 18, no. 3 (1988), 379–417.

neoliberal reforms by right-wing administrations in the early 1980s.²⁵ However, the increasingly influential far-left parties and movements within Western European countries were still not facing a significant political competition from the New Right at the time, and were consequently able to devote time and resources towards internal divisions and splits, as well as toward political campaigns against their leftist competitors. This was especially significant in France, where socialists, communists, anarchists and movements of the New Left soon found themselves in a state of an almost constant struggle for influence on the continuously expanding left-wing of the political spectrum.²⁶

Already during the first months of 1972, Yugoslav analysts assessed that the PCF leadership was increasing formal support for the Eurocommunist ideas, while expanding on the internal reforms not because of the genuine conviction that reforms are needed, but rather motivated by the notion that popularity of the reformist agenda could bring political gains.²⁷ Scholars often emphasize the importance of political pragmatism expressed by the moderate fraction of French communists, who slowly started taking over the important positions within the party from the old conservative bloc. While many conservatives still zealously advocated for replicating the principles of Bolshevik model in PCF policies, moderates were in favor of using any alternative ideas that could help reestablish the declining influence of the party on the French far-left.²⁸ During the same year, the PCF elected Georges Marchais, one of the informal leaders of the moderate fraction, to the position of the new General Secretary. On several occasions Marchais stated that he doesn't understand

-
- 25 Aurelie Andry, "Social Europe", in *the long 1970-The story of a defeat* (Florence: European University Institute, 2019), 93–143; Andreas Wirsching, "European Responses to the Crisis of 1970s and 1980s. Introductory Remarks", *Journal of Modern European History* 9, no. 2 (2011), 167–169.
- 26 Pascal Perrineau, "The Great Upheaval: Left and Right in Contemporary French Politics", in *France since the 1970s: History, Politics and Memory in an Age of Uncertainty*, ed. E. Chabal (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 3–17; Raymond Boudon, "The 1970s in France: A Period of Student Retreat", *Higher Education* 8, no. 6 (1979), 669–681.
- 27 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-255-267, Reports on the development of cooperation with the PCF, 1972.
- 28 Sue Ellen M. Charlton, "Deradicalization of the French Communist Party", *The Review of Politics* 41, no. 1 (1979), 38–60; Bruno Bongiovanni, "The French communist party in the 1970s", *Telos* 55, no. 1 (1983), 61–74.

many parts of the new Eurocommunist agenda, but sees the affirmative action towards its further development as a strategic move that would not only help PCF to retain its political relevancy in France, and also to strengthen relations between the PCF and other communist parties of the Mediterranean.²⁹ Authors of the reports arriving from various offices within the LCY agreed that the new party leadership under Marchais will strive to move the French party further away from the Soviet influence and closer towards the communist parties of Italy, Spain and Greece, who already recognized Eurocommunism as their ideology.³⁰

Almost immediately after the new party leadership of Marchais initiated talks about expansion of cooperation between the LCY and the PCF, Yugoslav representatives started urging Italian and Spanish communists to include their French counterparts in their plans about organizing international conferences, seminars and discussion groups of the Mediterranean Marxists.³¹ This particular case is rather significant because it implies that the influence of the Yugoslav communists, who again tried to partake in their role of mediators among the European communists, wasn't as significant as authors of the Yugoslav sources claimed. Italian communists, who still maintained cordial relations and frequent communication with the PCF despite the ideological disagreements, already made plans to include French communists in numerous gatherings of representatives from Eurocommunist parties, and seemed to be only expressing a pleasant surprise at the propositions made by LCY delegates.³² However, in the following years, Yugoslav communists invested even more time and resources in organizing and financing various events for the French communists, which served to promote the agenda of the

29 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-275-290, Reports on social and political situation in France, 1972-1974.

30 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-251, Report about the new attitudes of the PCF about the LCY, 1972.

31 AY, 507-IX, 48/I-513, Recorded conversations between the LCY and the PCF delegations, 1973.

32 On the other hand, in the case of Spanish communists, out of whom many lived in exile in Paris and were quite familiar with members of the PCF leadership, Yugoslav support for participation of the PCF in the international events organized for representatives of the reformist parties seemed to have been much less appreciated. Conflicts between the PCE and the PCF that started in 1968 and 1969 appeared to have left a longer lasting tensions, that were, according to the estimations made by Yugoslav analysts, still present during the 1977 summit of Eurocommunist leaders in Madrid. – AY, 507-IX, 122/I-130-162, Reports about the important attitudes of PCE, 1974-1976.

increasingly influential Eurocommunist fraction of the French party in one way or another, while trying to improve relations with the inner circle of Georges Marchais.³³

From 1974 to 1976, the LCY tried to mediate in reconciliation of the French communists and socialists, even going as far as to organize joint vacations in Yugoslavia for the representatives of labor unions aligned with PCF and those close to the French socialists.³⁴ Authors of the reports that circulated through offices of the Yugoslav party on more than one occasion assessed that closer cooperation with the socialist might help to push the French communists further towards Eurocommunist ideology. Analysts employed by the Department of International Relations especially emphasized his predictions that wider acceptance of Eurocommunist ideas will help the French party to finally complete defining those reforms which were expected to diminish already reduced cooperation between PCF and the Soviet party.³⁵ One of them concluded his report about the development of relations between the LCY and the PCF by estimating that with participation of the French party, a wider political initiative of the European far-left parties can finally be formed outside the Soviet sphere of influence.³⁶

Interestingly, Yugoslav analysts perceived determination of the PCF leadership to continuously cling on to their relations with the Soviet party, despite the gradual distancing between the French communists and Eastern bloc parties, as the most important cause of the last major conflict between LCY and PCF.³⁷ Heated but temporary disagreements between Yugoslav and French communists arose during the preparations for the conference of the European Worker's parties, which was scheduled to be held in Berlin during the late June of 1976. PCF delegates that were working on preparing the discussion points for the conference opted to support the Soviets during

33 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-329, Information on the internal development within the PCF, 1976.

34 AY, Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (142), International Cooperation, A-074-078, Reports about the development of cooperation with communist and socialist unions in France, 1974–1978.

35 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-291-319, Reports on analysis of the correspondence with the PCF, 1974–1975.

36 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-329, Information on the internal development within the PCF, 1976.

37 AY, 837, I-2/68, Preparations for the Conference of European Worker's Parties in Berlin, 1976.

their passionate arguments with Yugoslav and Italian representatives.³⁸ In the end, a compromise was reached between the radical reformist parties and those parties who supported the Soviets. Soviet delegation gave up on insisting that Bolshevik principles should be the defined in the joint statement as common guidelines that all Marxist parties should follow, thus essentially giving a form of a recognition to those ideologies constructed on the notion of adapting individual party policies to the local circumstances in which those parties are operating. In turn, Yugoslav and Italian communists signed the joint declaration, followed by many Marxist parties and movements from Western Europe, which provided Soviet party with the ability to present an image that it still holds influence among the Western Bloc communists.³⁹

However, French communists still kept on protesting against the compromising solution, and thus remained the only party that was exempted, at their own request, from some of the joint statements published after the conference. In some conclusions of the conference discussion various amendments could be found with the continuously repeated comment that they were added on the request of the French party, and that other present parties didn't took the same stance on the matter.⁴⁰ Authors of the reports produced by the Department of International Relations agreed that, after being abandoned by the Soviets, French delegates had to symbolically emphasize their uncompromising position in order to prevent losing face. And they opted to follow through with that plan while showcasing their rather well-known passion for long and abstract discussions about Marxist theory. Yugoslav analysts agreed that French communists are inevitably going to continue expanding the reforms of PCF policies for a foreseeable future, while at the same time continued reminding the LCY leadership that French communists seem to have already defined a surprisingly extensive theoretical justification for the possible abandonment of the reformist course.⁴¹

38 AJ, 507-IX, 48/I-502-506, Recorded conversations between delegates of the LCY and the PCI, 1975-1976.

39 AY, 837, I-2/68, Information on the attitudes of the PCF delegation present at the Berlin Conference, 1976.

40 AY, 837, I-2/68, Joint statements and conclusions of the European Worker's Parties Conference in Berlin, 1976.

41 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-336, Report on the development of cooperation with the PCF, 1976.

*Yugoslav attitudes after the XII Congress of PCF
and Eurocommunist summit in Madrid –
time of enthusiasm and first signs of gradual
abandonment of the reformist course*

During preparations for Mediterranean conferences of European communist parties planned for 1976 and 1977, members of the International Commission within the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia discussed a new tendency noticed among the French communists. They claimed that French communists appear to have been growing increasingly enthusiastic towards the prospects of conducting further reforms of their party policies, but have suspiciously often stated during the meetings with their Yugoslav and Italian counterparts that thus far introduced reforms are proving to be surprisingly profitable in terms of increasing PCF popularity in France.⁴² At the same time, authors of the reports commissioned by the Department of International Relations felt the need to reassure the LCY leadership that Eurocommunist ideas have a firm base of support within the French party, and that they will certainly shape the future policy making of the PCF, regardless of the extent to which the endorsement of party's leadership towards those same ideas is motivated by political opportunism.⁴³ However, already at that time, there were those among the analysts employed by the LCY who continuously emphasized the assessment that French Communist Party was, and never will be, a truly Eurocommunist party, as was the case with the communist parties of Italy, Greece and Spain. Consequently, they stressed that French communists could easily find themselves back in the same camp with the more zealous Marxists of Eastern Europe if an opportune moment appears, though such a moment was highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.⁴⁴

To a certain extent, assessments made by the analysts who provided LCY leadership with the necessary information and council about the cur-

42 AY, 142, A-074-078, Reports about preparation of the Mediterranean conferences, 1974–1978.

43 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-315, Information about preparations for the XXII Congress of the PCF, 1976.

44 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-317, Analysis of the conversations with PCF delegation present in Belgrade, 1976.

rents on the European far-left were somewhat confirmed by the results of future historical research. Some historians who studied the development of PCF policies have defined the Eurocommunist phase in the evolution of party ideology as a time of great enthusiasm for the many within the French party, both for those who truly believed in the Eurocommunist cause, and for those who hoped that adoption of a new ideology would return PCF to its position of prominence within French politics, which was somewhat shaken during the early years of political crisis.⁴⁵ On the other hand, scholarly analysis indicate that during the period later known as a “long year of European socialism” (1974–1976), it could have appeared to many contemporaries as though reformist far-left parties are becoming unstoppable political forces on the Mediterranean. Subsequently, it doesn’t come as surprising that Yugoslav analysts would conclude that Soviet party is highly unlikely to ever regain the influence it once held over the Marxist parties and movements within Western bloc countries.⁴⁶

And while Soviet influence grew increasingly confined to the Eastern bloc countries during the détente era, favorable conditions for the Eurocommunist parties continued to accumulate. Events such as the fall of the far-right dictatorship in Greece during 1974, the return of the Spanish communist leaders from exile after the death of Francisco Franco in 1975, and electoral successes of the Italian communists in 1976, could have contributed to the image of Eurocommunist parties as the rising political forces on the Mediterranean.⁴⁷ This image, coupled with potential fears from the growing influence of their socialist competitors on the French left-wing, could have influenced the decision of the French communists to finally define a new party ideology. During private meetings with Yugoslav communists held in the summer of 1976, PCF representatives openly stated that bringing a formal conclusion to the years long reformist campaign within the party is useful, among other reasons, for demonstrating to the voters and to all the potential critics that

45 Pavel Machala, „The French Communist Party, Polycentric Eurocommunism and Eastern Europe”, in *The Foreign Policies of the French Left*, ed. S. Serfaty (Oxford: Routledge, 1980), 88–114.

46 Aurelie Andry, *Social Europe: the Road Not Taken: The Left and European Integration in the Long 1970s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 133–156.

47 Andrea Donofrio, „Eurocommunism: The Rise and Fall of a Hopeful Project”, *Soundings* 86, no 1 (2024), 49–70.

French Communist Party is no longer the last bastion of dogmatic Bolshevism⁴⁸ on the European far-left.⁴⁹

However, this and other cases⁵⁰ of an almost blatant admission of opportunistic motives behind the acceptance of Eurocommunist principles did not prevent Yugoslav communists from continuing to invest both their own efforts and the resources of the party and the state in promoting the reformist course among the French communists. Mere weeks before the XXII Congress of the French Communist Party, which formally defined a new party ideology in 1976, the LCY initiated talks about expanding cooperation with the PCF and introduced new programs for providing various forms of aid to French communists.⁵¹ While the authors of the Department for International Relations' reports acknowledged that the XXII Congress's conclusions merely formalized the end of the PCF's protracted policy reforms, they still showed notable enthusiasm for the French party's open alignment with the Eurocommunist camp.⁵² Yugoslav delegates present at the Congress discussions remarked that

48 Or, in the words of some Italian communists, the cradle of Maoism. At one point during the temporary conflicts between the PCI and the PCF in the early 1970s, the PCI delegates who visited Yugoslavia referenced an existing stereotype about disgruntled Bolsheviks among the French communists as rather turning towards Maoism then towards a less radical ideological alternative (AY, 507-IX, 48/I-490, Information on the attitudes of the PCI about European integrations, 1973). Though there are indeed some instances of former PCF members enthusiastically writing about Maoist ideas, the most notable being the case of Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, scholarly analysis indicates that such cases were relatively rare outside of the small circles of Marxist philosophers. For further information on the issue, see: Mark Poster, *Existential Marxism in Postwar France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

49 AY, 837, I-2/68, Analysis of the discussions with PCF representatives present at the Berlin Conference, 1976.

50 One such case was noticed by Yugoslav analysts soon after the turbulent events on the European far-left during 1976. Yugoslav sources testify that Georges Marchais, upon returning from the summit of Eurocommunist leaders held in Madrid during the spring of 1977, had publicly spoken about how he had chosen to start using the term Eurocommunism in public as often as possible. Marchais admitted that he came to this decision after having been informed by the analytical departments of the PCF that the term is very popular among the French public, and especially with the youth and intellectuals. – AY, 507-IX, 48/I-540, Analysis of the joint statement of the PCI and the PCF, 1977.

51 AY, 142, A-074-078, Reports about the development of cooperation with communist and socialist unions in France, 1974–1978.

52 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-329, Information on the internal development within the PCF, 1976.

many French communists are using the same fervor to defend their new Eurocommunist convictions as they used to defend their Bolshevik ideas at the beginning of the decade. Interestingly, they had also noted that the French communists are composing their speeches in such a manner that an observer could be tempted to conclude that they are passionately arguing against an imaginary opponent, which the Yugoslav communists interpreted as a sign of still lingering guilt for abandoning the ideological zealotry of their past. At the same time, it should be noted that such observations didn't appear as potent enough to challenge the overall enthusiastic support of Yugoslav party towards the reformist agenda of the Congress, and that Yugoslav delegates used the opportunity of attending the sessions to further expand on previous discussions about expanding cooperation with their French counterparts.⁵³

The following year, after the 1977 summit of Eurocommunist leaders in Madrid, institutions and representatives of the Yugoslav party started drafting their first long-term programs for cooperation with the French party for the years 1978 and 1979. From the perspective of Yugoslav communists, this could be interpreted a sign of increasing trust in both their increasingly cordial relations with the French party's institutions and individual representatives, as well as in the assessment that cooperation between the two parties will last long enough for such extensive plans to be realized.⁵⁴ Although, these plans appear to have disregarded, at least to a certain extent, the need to take affirmative action in order to influence further strengthening of the reformist resolve within the circles of French communists, which was heavily emphasized in previous Yugoslav sources that discussed cooperation with PCF during the 1970s.⁵⁵ It could be argued that, after the XXII Congress of PCF and the Eurocommunist summit in Madrid, the Yugoslav communists felt confident enough that the French party would keep advancing on its incremental reformist course. However, that explanation, though impactful to a certain extent, doesn't appear to be sufficient when recorded conversations between the Yugoslav and French communists from the same period are taken into acco-

53 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-315, Reports from Yugoslav delegates present at the XXII Congress of the PCF, 1976.

54 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-367-388, Reports about development of cooperation with the PCF, 1978–1979.

55 AY, 837, I-2/68, Analysis of the discussions with PCF representatives present at the Berlin Conference, 1976.

unt. Precisely in late 1977 and early 1978, Yugoslav communists started to devote less and less time towards inquiring about the results achieved by PCF policies of internal democratization or decentralization, as well as about the relations between French communists and their more moderate counterparts on the left.⁵⁶ On numerous occasions after the important yet mostly symbolic proclamations of Eurocommunist affiliations made by the PCF in 1976 and 1977, Yugoslav communists seemed as if they had somewhat lost interest in the future of the reformist course of the French party.⁵⁷

Another indicator that Yugoslav communists were beginning to disregard reformist tendencies within the French party, which they ferociously defended and tried to encourage until that point, maybe can be found in the recorded conversations between Yugoslav and Italian communists during the final years of the decade marked by political crisis in Western Europe. After the death of Aldo Moro in 1978 and subsequent renewal of the tensions between Italian Communist Party and Christian Democracy in 1979, Italian communists were eager to pick up their work on organizing new international initiatives comprised of European far-left parties.⁵⁸ Subsequently, leadership of the Italian party started to devote more and more attention towards the quickly shifting attitudes of the French party about limitations of the reformist strive surge among European Marxists. On the other hand, Yugoslav communists, who just years ago used to be the ones who asked their Italian counterparts about relations of competing factions within the PCF, now found it appropriate to advise Italian communists not to devote their already overstressed attention towards the inner workings of another communist party.⁵⁹ On numerous occasions, the LCY de-

56 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-313-367, Analysis of the correspondence between the LCY and the PCF, 1976–1978.

57 One such example can be observed during negotiations about the preparation for Mediterranean conferences of the European Communist parties. Recorded conversations between the representatives of the LCY and the PCF testify that Yugoslav delegates have almost completely stopped inquiring about the state of PCF reformist programs during 1977 and 1978. – AY, 142, A-074-078, Reports about preparation of the Mediterranean conferences, 1974–1978.

58 Ronald Eckford Mill Irving, „International Policy of the French and Italian communists”, *International Affairs* 53, no. 3 (1977), 405–421; Patrick McCarthy, „Italian Communists: Internationalisms Old and New”, *The SAIS Review of International Affairs* 10, no. 1 (1990), 163–177.

59 AY, 507-IX, 48/I-590-633, Reports on the international policies and initiatives of the PCI, 1978–1979.

legates concluded their exchanges with the Italian communists regarding the evolution of PCF ideology by asserting that the French communists' genuine commitment to Eurocommunist principles ultimately mattered little, so long as they remained willing to cooperate and participate in the initiatives organized by Italian and Yugoslav parties.⁶⁰ These statements were in a contrast with what the Yugoslav communists claimed to be their stance on the matter years ago, at the beginning of the political crisis of the 1970s. Back then, the Yugoslav party firmly defended the attitude that it isn't important to what extent are French communists willing to cooperate with other parties of the Western camp as long as they remain on the course of constantly reforming their party policies.⁶¹ It could be argued that, from the Yugoslav perspective, emphasizing the expansion of reforms served the practical purpose of eventually securing the cooperation of the PCF. Yet the authors of the reports produced by the Department of International Relations never explicitly addressed such considerations. However, their writings appear as though they have completely lost interest in the future of the Eurocommunist path of the French party as the decade of a great turmoil on the European far-left was approaching its end.⁶²

*Yugoslav support for radicalization efforts of Georges Marchais –
how old rivals finally found common grounds on the road towards
abandonment of the reformist course*

Yugoslav communists seem to have started gradually losing interest for the inner workings of the French Communist Party at precisely the time when French communists were entering a period of growing enthusiasm for

60 AY, 142, A-074-078, Summaries on cooperation with political parties in Italy and France, 1974–1978.

61 During the turbulent events of 1968 and 1969 Yugoslav communists began referring to the “Eastern” and “Western” camp to describe the emerging division among Europe’s communist parties. According to definitions provided by the LCY analysts, the Eastern camp was comprised of the Eastern Bloc parties with the addition of French party, while the Western camp comprised numerous small movements and parties that followed the LCY and the PCI in their reformist efforts. – AY, 507-IX, 48/I-432-456, Recorded conversations with members of PCI leadership (Enrico Berlinguer, Giancarlo Pajetta, Carlo Gallucci, etc.), 1969–1970.

62 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-367-388, Reports about development of cooperation with the PCF, 1978–1979.

Eurocommunism. In late 1977 and early 1978, analysts working for the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia noticed that the French communists give the impression of being significantly more committed to enacting reformist policies, and even more to engaging in discussions about those same policies in French and other European media. However, authors of the same reports made no attempts, like in the previous years, to assess the depth, sincerity or the future development of the reforms within the PCF.⁶³ On the other hand, towards the end of the decade, another trend was emerging among the Yugoslav communists, which appears to have been somewhat contradictory to earlier LCY attitudes on reformist tendencies with the French party. During 1979, some reports of the Department of International Relations were questioning whether enthusiasm for Eurocommunism went too far among some circles within the French communists.⁶⁴ At the time, the analysts at the International commissions within the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia were already portraying the efforts made by Georges Marchais and his associates in a favorable light, while striving to preserve those party attitudes that were at the time considered by both Yugoslav and French communists to be essential for defining the PCF as a political party of the far left.⁶⁵

Numerous members of the Ideological Commission within the federal structure of the LCY had previously stated that the French party is positioned exactly where it should be. According to their assessments, that position could be described as distant from the Soviet party, but also distant from those communist parties of the Mediterranean who had conducted such extensive reforms that their attitudes were now almost indistinguishable from those of the socialists and other more moderate leftists in Western European countries.⁶⁶ During the final months of 1979 and the first months of 1980, when the

63 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-352-364, Analysis of the talks held between delegations of the LCY and the PCF, 1978.

64 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-367-388, Reports about development of cooperation with the PCF, 1978-1979.

65 AY, 142, A-074-078, Information on cooperation with the labor unions in France, 1974-1978.

66 AY, 507, Ideological Commission, II/2-b-(244-252), Materials from the sessions of the Ideological Commission of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 1978.

activities of Yugoslav party offices and visits by delegations from other communist parties were to some extent curtailed by the illness of LCY president Josip Broz Tito, there was a significant decline in the frequency of correspondence with all the Eurocommunist parties, with the notable exception of the French party. For the first time, the number of programs designed to finance mutual research visits and joint participation in international seminars was higher for the French party than for the Italian party, which had until then been regarded by Yugoslav analysts as the LCY's closest ally among Europe's communist parties.⁶⁷ Not long after the death of Tito in May 1980, Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in France comprised an elaborate report on the actions of Yugoslav students present at a gathering organized the PCF's youth wing, where young Yugoslav Marxists fervently supported their French counterparts in their demands that Georges Marchais take a stand against the reformist tendencies within the PCF.⁶⁸ Scholars would later refer to these events as the beginning of a neo-Stalinist revolt within the party spearheaded by the new young radicals, which ended with Marchais gaining new executive powers and numerous advocates for continuation of the Eurocommunist reforms getting expelled from the party.⁶⁹

Finally, when Georges Marchais refused to publicly condemn the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan at the turn of 1979-1980, Yugoslav communists complemented the restraint of the PCF General Secretary, but still remained somewhat critical towards the tendency of the French communists to covertly support Soviet interventions.⁷⁰ However, during the summer of the same year, after Marchais started to openly support the Soviet war effort and to give interviews on the situation in Afghanistan for the Soviet media, Yugoslav analysts claimed that Marchais is the only truly objective far-left le-

67 AY, 507-IX, 48/I-565-688, Reports on development of cooperation with PCI, 1977-1979; AY, 507-IX, 30/I-290-356, Reports on development of cooperation with PCF 1977-1979.

68 Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia (DAMFAS), Political Archive (PA), Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (FSFA), Year 1980, France, File 41, Reports on the important attitudes of PCF.

69 David Bell, Byron Criddle, „The Decline of the French Communist Party”, *British Journal of Political Science* 19, no. 4 (1989), 515-536; George Ross, „Party Decline and Changing Party Systems: France and French Communist Party”, *Comparative Politics* 25, no. 1 (1992), 43-61.

70 DAMFAS, PA, FSFA, 1980, France, F-41, Reports on the important attitudes of the PCF.

ader in the West who strives towards the resolution of the conflict, instead of jumping at an opportunity to appease right-wing liberals and moderate leftists by criticizing the Soviets. In the following weeks, the Yugoslav party designed new programs of financing vacations and research visits for leading French communists.⁷¹ Even Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in Paris, whose reports traditionally displayed greater subtlety and analytical depth than those produced by analysts within the departments of the LCY Presidency, praised Marchais's efforts to distinguish himself from the socialist leader, Francois Mitterrand, whom they deemed as overly compromising not just towards the US and Great Britain, but towards liberal parties as well. Consequently, it doesn't come as a surprise that Marchais opted to start his great "world tour" in preparation for the presidential campaign against Mitterrand by visiting Yugoslavia.⁷²

This becomes especially important within the broader perspective of the attitudes of Yugoslav communists towards the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. For example, at the same time as Marchais received support from the LCY for his 'world tour', Yugoslav and Italian communists were heavily engaged in criticizing the recent Soviet intervention and the role of the Soviet Communist Party in the events that lead to such an outcome.⁷³ On the other hand, numerous sources created by various LCY departments indicate that Yugoslav communists were more than ready to turn a blind eye to the fact that the PCF was openly defending Soviet actions in Afghanistan, stating that the ongoing internal struggle in France between communists and socialists (with whom the LCY traditionally maintained even closer and more cordial relations than with the PCF) should be a priority for all those who don't wish France to join in the growingly global tide of neoliberal economic reforms.⁷⁴ However, knowing that the LCY simultaneously still maintained good relati-

71 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-388-410, Reports about development of cooperation with the PCF, 1979–1980.

72 DAMFAS, PA, FSFA, 1980, France, F-41, Reports on the important attitudes of the PCF.

73 See: Bogdan Živković, *Yugoslavia and Eurocommunism: Yugoslavia and the Italian Communist Party in the Sixties and Seventies* (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies SASA, 2025).

74 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-388-410, Reports about development of cooperation with the PCF, 1979–1980; DAMFAS, PA, FSFA, 1980, France, F-41, Reports on the important attitudes of PCF.

ons with Mitterand's new socialist fraction, it would be safe to assume that first signs of neoliberalism in France were not yet as alarming for Yugoslav communists as they would become years later. Rather, the decisive factor that contributed to the willingness of the LCY to avoid engaging in debates about the situation in Afghanistan with the French communists could have been the fact that this matter wasn't seen as important on the European far-left as was the invasion of Czechoslovakia more than a decade ago, and that the Yugoslav communists mostly considered Soviet influence on the Eurocommunist party to be permanently crippled and thus in no need for further undermining.⁷⁵

Mitterand would win the 1981 presidential elections, and that event would be defined by some historians as a symbolic conclusion of more than a decade long political crisis in France. Political influence of the French communist party suffered a rapid decline in the following years, as did the prestige of the PCF in the sphere of relations between Marxist parties of Western Europe.⁷⁶ Mediterranean communist parties were growing increasingly distant from the French party and criticized French communists for abandoning Eurocommunist ideas, while the LCY remained the only party outside the Eastern Bloc that supported ideological radicalization of the PCF under the leadership of Georges Marchais.⁷⁷ During the late 1970s and early 1980s, as relations between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the remaining Eurocommunist parties, notably those of Italy, Spain and Greece, gradually became distant and eventually collapsed, cooperation between the Yugoslav and the French party appeared to enter a renewed period of sustained expansion and intensification.

Over the course of a decade, Yugoslav communists crossed a long road from criticizing the French party for refusing to conduct internal reforms, failing to condemn Soviet military interventionism, and keeping close relations with the Eastern bloc parties, towards supporting those same actions

75 Luka Filipović, „Yugoslav Communists and the European Far-Left – from First Supporters of Italian Eurocommunists to Last Allies of French Neo-Stalinists (1965-1985)”, *Filozofija i društvo* 34, no. 4 (2023), 591–612.

76 George Ross, „The Dilemmas of Communism in Mitterand's France”, *New Political Science* 4, no. 2 (1983), 71–92; Armen Antonian, „The French Communists Under Francois Mitterand”, *Political Studies* 33, no. 2 (1985), 254–273.

77 DAMFAS, PA, FSFA, 1980, France, F-41, Information on the exchange of visits with PCF planned or 1981.

when French communists repeated them years later. While on that road, Yugoslav communists invested a substantial amount of time and resources in the efforts to encourage the reformist course of PCF, only to end up supporting Georges Marchais and his associates in the efforts to abandon the same reformist policies.⁷⁸ The two parties entered the decade of political crisis in Western Europe with turbulent relations which often led them to stand at odds with each other. Towards the end of the *détente* period and the last decade of welfare state economic model in Europe, Yugoslav and French communists maintained cordial relations. This connection was likely strengthened by a mutual realization that they were the only two significant Marxist parties outside the Eastern Bloc that continued to oppose internal democratization within their own ranks.⁷⁹ From the perspective of Yugoslav communists, the French communist party accepted a reformist course at the right moment, but remained wise enough to abandon it before these reforms went too far. Analysts from various LCY departments, however, failed or deliberately avoided to ask themselves a critically important question – to what extent were their own perceptions of the changes within the PCF influenced by the changes that the LCY went through during this turbulent period in French, as well as in Yugoslav history?

Beside numerous other factors that could contributed towards unusually fast shifting of the dominant LCY attitudes about the reformist policies of the PCF, such were complex and changing interests of the Yugoslav party and the state, there could have also been an ideological reason behind the relatively swift succession of seemingly contradictory perceptions. Scholarly analyses indicate that the Yugoslav party started gradually abandoning its own reformist course during the turbulent events that occurred from 1972 to 1975.⁸⁰ Analyzed sources, however, don't contain examples of this change ha-

78 AY, 142, A-074-078, Reports about preparation of the Mediterranean conferences, 1974–1978.

79 Piotr Winczorek, „Self Government: The French and the Yugoslav Models Compared”, *International Review of Sociology* 24, no. 1 (1988), 223–240; Filipović, „Yugoslav Communists and the European far-left”, 591–612.

80 On the abandonment of the reformist course by the Yugoslav communists and radicalization of repressive policies against opposition in Yugoslavia during 1970s, see: Milivoj Bešlin, *Ideja moderne Srbije u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji* (Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2022); Bojan Dimitrijević, Luka Filipović, *Anarholiberalizam: Ideologija i služba 1967–*

ving an immediate impact on the relations between the LCY and Eurocommunist parties. Yugoslav communists continued supporting reformist courses of the other Marxist parties of Western Europe, and even expanded their policies of providing financial aid to the Eurocommunists. This trend lasted until the late 1970s and early 1980 with almost no significant interruptions, and analysts employed by the LCY on numerous occasions openly stated that the preservation of support for reformist efforts of other parties is crucial for the preservation of Yugoslav influence on the European far-left.⁸¹ However, toward the end of this decade, a period marked by political crisis hiding beneath the veil of détente, the deep structural and ideological shifts within the LCY, alongside geopolitical realignments affecting Yugoslavia's international standing, finally seemed to catch up with its communists. These developments subsequently began to shape both their perceptions and their party stances toward other communist parties. The shifting perceptions of Yugoslav communists about reformist anti-reformist tendencies of the French party during the 1970s represents one of the first and most blatant examples of how Yugoslav communists gradually abandoned their doctrine of supporting reformist agendas within other communist parties, which they had been following for more than two decades.

Summary

The renewal of cooperation between the LCY and PCF during the late 1950s was followed by a long and turbulent period in the development of relations between the two parties, which was marked by frequent conflicts over ideological differences and stances on the influence exerted by the Soviet party on communist parties of the Western Bloc. After the turbulent events of the late 1960s and with the beginning of political crisis of the 1970s, the French Communist Party started gradually accepting reformist policies and

1985 (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2024); Срђан Цветковић, *Отпор комунистичком режиму у Србији 1941–1991* (Beograd: Catena Mundi, 2021); Laslo Sekelj, *Jugoslavija, struktura raspadanja* (Beograd: RAD, 1990)

81 AY, 507-IX, 30/I-313-367, Analysis of the correspondence between the LCY and the PCF, 1976–1978; AY, 507-IX, 48/I-490, Information on the attitudes of the PCI about European integrations, 1973; AY, 837, I-2/68, Preparations for the Conference of European Worker's Parties in Berlin, 1976.

defining a new, Eurocommunist ideology. Although numerous contemporaries argued that the French party never truly became a Eurocommunist party, slow and limited reforms conducted by the French communists opened up a door for an unprecedented expansion of collaboration between the LCY and the PCF. Yugoslav communists created various forms of financial aid and invested their international influence in the effort to ease the burden of distancing from the Soviet party for their French counterparts, as well as to encourage further reforms of PCF policies. However, Yugoslav party refused to cease expanding those same policies and give up the practice of constantly improving cooperation with PCF even after General Secretary of the French party, Georges Marchais, openly abandoned the reformist course. At the end of the decade, attitudes of Yugoslav communists towards the reformist trends on the European far-left started gradually shifting. Facing new internal circumstances and the changing geopolitical situation, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia experienced major internal shifts which affected the development of the party's ideology. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Yugoslav communists found themselves among the few far-left parties outside the Eastern Bloc that supported Georges Marchais and his associates in their bid to return the PCF to the pre-Eurocommunist practices they had previously criticized. In the end, old rivals from the times of great splits on the European far-left finally found common ground in the joint struggle against the same reformist ideas that they once supported.

Reference List – Списак референци

Archives – Архиви

- Archives of Yugoslavia. Fond 142, Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia; Fond 507, League of Communists of Yugoslavia; Fund 837, Cabinet of the President of the Republic.
- Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia. Political Archive.

Secondary Works – Литература

- Andry, Aurelie. “*Social Europe*”, in *the long 1970 - The story of a defeat*. Florence: European University Institute, 2019. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192867094.001.0001
- Andry, Aurelie. *Social Europe: the Road Not Taken: The Left and European Integration in the Long 1970s*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192867094.001.0001.
- Antonian, Armen. „The French Communists Under Francois Mitterand”. *Political Studies* 33, no. 2 (1985), 254–273.
- Bell, David and Byron Criddle. „The Decline of the French Communist Party”. *British Journal of Political Science* 19, no. 4 (1989), 515–536.
- Bešlin, Milivoj. *Ideja moderne Srbije u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji*. Novi Sad: Akademaska knjiga, 2022.
- Bongiovanni, Bruno. „The French communist party in the 1970s”. *Telos* 55, no. 1 (1983), 61–74.
- Boudon, Raymond. „The 1970s in France: A Period of Student Retreat”. *Higher Education* 8, no. 6 (1979), 669–681.
- Chabal, Emile. „French Political Culture in the 1970s”. *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 42, no. 2 (2016), 243–265. DOI: 10.13109/gege.2016.42.2.243.
- Charlton, Sue Ellen. „Deradicalization of the French Communist Party”. *The Review of Politics* 41, no. 1 (1979), 38–60.
- Cvetković, Srđan. *Otpor komunističkom režimu u Srbiji 1941–1991*. Beograd: Caterna Mundi, 2021. (Cyrillic)
- Dimitrijević, Bojan i Luka Filipović. *Anarholiberalizam: Ideologija i služba 1967–1985*. Beograd: Arhipelag, 2024.
- Donofrio, Andrea. „Eurocommunism: The Rise and Fall of a Hopefull Project”. *Soundings* 86, no 1 (2024), 49–70. DOI: 10.3898/SOUN.86.03.2024.
- Dragišić, Petar. „The Yugoslav Perspective on Eurocommunism in the second half of the 1970s”. *Balkanica* 54, no. 1 (2023), 301–317. DOI: 10.2298/BALC2253301D
- Elleinstein, Jean. „Eurocommunism and the French communist party”. In *In Search of Eurocommunism*, ed. R. Kindersley, 66–79. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1981.

- Filipović, Luka. „Finansijska politika Saveza komunista Jugoslavije prema komunističkim partijama Italije, Francuske, Španije i Grčke krajem šezdesetih godina 20. Veka”. *Istorija 20. veka* 40, no. 2 (2022), 477–494. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2022.2.fil.477-494>
- Filipović, Luka. „Yugoslav Communists and the European Far-Left – from First Supporters of Italian Eurocommunists to Last Allies of French Neo-Stalinists (1965-1985)”. *Filozofija i društvo* 34, no. 4 (2023), 591–612. DOI: 10.2298/FID2304591F
- Filipović, Luka. „Zenith and Downfall of the Mediterranean far-left: League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Eurocommunists in the late 1970s”. *Istorija 20. veka* 44, no. 2 (2026), 511–530. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2026.2.fil.511-530>
- Filipović, Luka. *Evrokomunizam i Jugoslavija 1968-1980*. Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, Beograd: ISI 2023.
- Hazareesingh, Sudhir. *Intellectuals and the French Communist Party: Disillusion and Decline*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
- Irving, Ronald Eckford Mill. „International Policy of the French and Italian communists”. *International Affairs* 53, no. 3 (1977), 405–421.
- Kriegel, Annie. „The present theory of power of the French Communist Party”. *Government and Opposition* 2, no. 2 (1967), 253–268.
- Lavau, Georges. „The PCF, the State and the Revolution: An Analysis of Party Policies, Communications and Popular Culture”. In *Communism in Italy and France*, ed. Donald Blackmer, 87–143. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Libbey, Kenneth R. „French Communist party in the 1960s: An Ideological Profile”. *Journal of Contemporary History* 11, no. 1 (1976), 145–165.
- Machala, Pavel. „The French Communist Party, Polycentric Eurocommunism and Eastern Europe”. In *The Foreign Policies of the French Left*, ed. S. Serfaty, 88–114. Oxford: Routledge, 1980.
- McCarthy, Patrick. „Italian Communists: Internationalisms Old and New”. *The SAIS Review of International Affairs* 10, no. 1 (1990), 163–177.
- Micaud, Charles A. „Organization and Leadership of the French Communist Party”. *World Politics* 4, no. 3 (1952), 318–355.
- Mikecin, Vjekoslav. *Evrokomunizam i socijalizam*. Zagreb: Globus, 1979.
- Mišić, Saša. „Ne može se više ponoviti 1948. godina!: Jugoslavija i italijanski komunisti i socijalisti 1957-1962”. *Tokovi istorije* 30, no. 2 (2022), 153–185. (Cyrillic) DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31212/tokovi.2022.2.mis.153-185>
- Moran, Michael. „Crisis of the Welfare State”. *British Journal of Political Science* 18, no. 3 (1988), 379–417. DOI:10.1017/S0007123400005172

- Perrineau, Pascal. „The Great Upheaval: Left and Right in Contemporary French Politics”. In *France since the 1970s: History, Politics and Memory in an Age of Uncertainty*, ed. E. Chabal, 3–17. London: Bloomsbury, 2015.
- Pons, Silvio. *The Rise and Fall of Eurocommunism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Poster, Mark. *Existential Marxism in Postwar France*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Raymond, Gino G. *The French Communist Party During the Fifth Republic – A Crisis of Leadership and Ideology*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Ross, George. „Party Decline and Changing Party Systems: France and French Communist Party”. *Comparative Politics* 25, no. 1 (1992), 43–61.
- Ross, George. „The Dilemmas of Communism in Mitterand’s France”. *New Political Science* 4, no. 2 (1983), 71–92.
- Sekelj, Laslo. *Jugoslavija, struktura raspadanja*. Beograd: RAD, 1990.
- Verdès-Leroux, Jeannine. „The French Communist Party in the 1950s – Between the National Tradition and Counter-Culture”. In *France and Mass Media*, ed. B. Rigby, 5–19. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991.
- Winczorek, Piotr. „Self government: The French and the Yugoslav Models Compared”. *International Review of Sociology* 24, no. 1 (1988), 223–240.
- Wirsching, Andreas. „European Responses to the Crisis of 1970s and 1980s. Introductory Remarks”. *Journal of Modern European History* 9, no. 2 (2011), 167–169. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17104/1611-8944_2011_2_167
- Wright, George. „Reflections on the French Resistance 1940–1944”. *Political Science Quarterly* 77, no. 3 (1962), 336–349.
- Živković, Bogdan. „Two Last Encounters Between Broz and Berlinguer – the Epilogue of an Alliance”. *Balkanica* 53, no. 1 (2022), 274–300. DOI: 10.2298/BALC2253273Z

РЕЗИМЕ

Лука Филиповић

Промена перспективе: Југословенски комунисти и трансформација
идеологије Комунистичке партије Француске током политичке
кризе седамдесетих година 20. века

АПСТРАКТ: Овај чланак разматра промене југословенских виђења реформистичких политика које су француски комунисти прво усвојили, а затим напустили током политичке кризе седамдесетих година 20. века. Поред тога, он истражује развој односа између Савеза комуниста Југославије и Француске комунистичке партије, као и бројне факторе који су могли утицати на процес током којег су, за нешто мање од две деценије, ти односи еволуирали од стања готово сталног сукоба ка стању сарадње. Чланак се првенствено заснива на анализи југословенских архивских извора и до сада објављеној научној литератури из различитих области друштвених и хуманистичких наука.

КЉУЧНЕ РЕЧИ: Савез комуниста Југославије, Комунистичка партија Француске, криза државе благостања, детант, еврокомунизам, Јосип Броз Тито, Жорж Марше

Обнова сарадње између Савеза Комуниста Југославије и Комунистичке партије Француске током касних педесетих година прошлог века била је праћена дугим и турбулентним периодом у развоју односа између двеју партија. Овај период обележили су чести сукоби око идеолошких разлика и ставова о утицају који је совјетска партија вршила на комунистичке партије Западног блока. Након бурних догађаја с краја шездесетих и почетком политичке кризе седамдесетих година, Француска комунистичка партија је почела постепено да прихвата реформистичке политике и да дефинише нову, еврокомунистичку идеологију. Иако су многи савременици тврдили да француска партија никада заиста није постала еврокомунистичка партија, споре и ограничене реформе које су спровели француски комунисти отвориле су врата за до тада

невиђену експанзију сарадње француске и југословенске партије. Југословенски комунисти су стварали различите форме финансијске помоћи и улагали свој међународни утицај у напоре да француским реформистима олакшају терет удаљавања од совјетске партије, као и да подстакну даље реформе унутар Комунистичке партије Француске. Међутим, југословенска партија је одбила да престане са ширењем тих истих политика и да се одрекне праксе сталног унапређивања сарадње са Комунистичком партијом Француске чак и након што је генерални секретар француске партије Жорж Марше отворено напустио реформистички курс. Крајем деценије, ставови југословенских комуниста према реформистичким трендовима на европској крајњој левици почели су постепено да се мењају. Суочавајући се са новим унутрашњим околностима и променама геополитичке ситуације, Савез комуниста Југославије је доживео велике унутрашње промене које су утицале на развој партијске идеологије. Крајем седамдесетих и почетком осамдесетих година, Савез комуниста остаје једна од последњих партија крајње левнице изван Источног блока које су подржавале напоре Маршеа и његових сарадника у настојању да врате исте праксе које су претходиле еврокомунистичкој епохи, а које су југословенски комунисти раније критиковали. На крају, стари ривали из времена великих расцепа на крајњој европској левици коначно су пронашли заједнички језик у борби против истих реформистичких тенденција које су некада подржавали.